Q7 STOLEN
Thread Starter
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1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
I thank you for your advice yeh its a way ..but even that they can detect and disable..i think the only thing left iks to use pulse clearance and voice recodnition for cars to start,
i mean these things are availiable in high end note booke, and they cost much less then the whole enchelada of imobilizer and alarms...simply car wont start till it knows your voice and your pulce..simple as windows do ...but no they wont use that though technology is availiable ...it does not cost much..this si why they wont use it...so we end up being stolen and we pay our hearts out ...just cause we like a barnd and have truct in the company that govern's it ....sorry for being so sour but been to the cops again and beleive me so GPS no immobilizer...no alarm...nothing can stop theives...the more sophisticated and more expencive ...easier to break ...i think were being fooled as consumers...not only audi ..merc.s bmw..all the high end cars they should provide protection ..and choose teh best methode..to my mind now...i think when cars are stolen...companie's dont mind ..you would have to buy another car..with insurance money witch will charge you a higher premiuim...while they get tax reduction and other benefits for paying out....the only person who loose is teh consumer..cause were so naive..we get attached to our cars..our kids also ..and the hurt ...can not be covered by any insurance..
sorry again ...the more i think ...and dig...the these things seems ........
cheers
i mean these things are availiable in high end note booke, and they cost much less then the whole enchelada of imobilizer and alarms...simply car wont start till it knows your voice and your pulce..simple as windows do ...but no they wont use that though technology is availiable ...it does not cost much..this si why they wont use it...so we end up being stolen and we pay our hearts out ...just cause we like a barnd and have truct in the company that govern's it ....sorry for being so sour but been to the cops again and beleive me so GPS no immobilizer...no alarm...nothing can stop theives...the more sophisticated and more expencive ...easier to break ...i think were being fooled as consumers...not only audi ..merc.s bmw..all the high end cars they should provide protection ..and choose teh best methode..to my mind now...i think when cars are stolen...companie's dont mind ..you would have to buy another car..with insurance money witch will charge you a higher premiuim...while they get tax reduction and other benefits for paying out....the only person who loose is teh consumer..cause were so naive..we get attached to our cars..our kids also ..and the hurt ...can not be covered by any insurance..
sorry again ...the more i think ...and dig...the these things seems ........
cheers
Thread Starter
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1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
Hello again everybodey, please do not get bored form thi ssubject i think its in evry bodey 's conacern...i have searched ..and look what i found on yahoo...i realy think var producers should do the same reaserch before they implement any security system in theire cars and then they sell it to us ..please read:
( this information is for educational purposes only, to help you with security)
You could find out what kind of cryptography they are using for the locks that would make it 10x easier to pick the lock and your one step closer to stealing it. Organic vs Electronic security have both their flaws. A metal key or an electronic key, both can be breached using brute force. Normally the Diablo or typicllay any Lamborgini will have radio-frequency keylocks and igigniton starters. Using Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) from your labtop you could easily unlock the Diablo and start it. That is were my knowledge comes in handy.
I myself have cracked RFID, and TI DST. The encryption algorithm used in the TI DST tags is an unpublished, proprietary cipher that uses a 40-bit key. The algorithm was designed in the early 1990's by engineers at Texas Intruments, but is still being deploying in current systems. By today's standards, a 40-bit key is unacceptably short: advances in computing power have made such keys succeptable to brute-force key guessing attacks. Therefore, the actual security of the DST system rests with the secrecy of the proprietary algorithm used in the tags. One of the most important principles in cryptographic design states, however, that the security of a system should be based only on the secrecy of the keys, never on the secrecy of the algorithm.
We used some new special-purpose cryptanalytic techniques to reconstruct the algorithm used in the DST tags, by simply observing the responses that actual DST tags computed when presented with a large number of specially chosen challeneges. Using this black-box reverse-engineering method, we were able to implement a software program that, when given the same challenge and key as an actual tag, would compute the same response.
Our next step was to recover the secret key from a deployed DST device, using a brute-force key search. Unfortunately, it would have taken more than 2 weeks for our software implementation to find a key when running on 10 very fast PCs. We therefore implemented our key-search on a field programmable gate array (FPGA). The FPGA evaluation board we used is available online for under $200 in single quantities with all of the neccesary development software and cabling. Our implementation cracks 32 keys in parallel on a single FPGA running at 100MHz. At this rate, a single FPGA is expected to crack a key in just over 10 hours.
To decrease this key-cracking time even furthur, we connected 16 FPGAs together at a total cost of under $3,500. Texas Instruments provided us with 5 DST tags whose keys we did not know. The 16-way parallel cracker was able to recover all 5 keys in well under 2 hours.
We are currently developing and testing even faster and cheaper methods for recovering DST keys and will update this page with these results when they become available. The details are available in our academic paper.
After recovering a key, in order to attack a real DST system, we needed to create a radio device that could speak the same protocol as a hardware DST tag. This device would allow us to quickly extract the information needed to recover a key from a target DST device, and once the key was cracked, completely emulate the DST to a legitimate reader.
To accomplish this, we equipped a small and easily portable PC with a Measurement Computing digital-to-analog conversion (DAC) board; this board is also capable of analog-to-digital conversion. The DAC board can perform 12-bit A/D conversions on an input signal at a rate of 1.25 MHz and can perform D/A conversions and generate an output signal at a rate of 1 MHz.
We connected the input and output channels on our DAC board to an antenna tuned to the correct frequency range. We wrote modulation and demodulation software routines to decode and produce the analog AM signals transmitted by the TI reader as well as FM-FSK analog signals transmitted by the transponders. Using these routines, our equipment can eavesdrop on the communication protocol between a DST reader and transponder, or participate actively in a protocol by emulating either device. More details on this software radio solution are available in the academic paper.
To validate our attack, we extracted the key from our own SpeedPass token and simulated it in our independent programmable RF device. We purchased gasoline successfully at an ExxonMobil station multiple times in the course of a single day using this digital simulator. Similarly, we recovered the cryptographic key from a DST in the ignition key of our 2005 model Ford Escape SUV. By simulating the DST, we spoofed the immobilizer authentication system and started the vehicle with a bare ignition key, that is, with one that possessed no DST at all. Viewed another way, we created the pre-conditions for hot-wiring the vehicle.
Our attack on the DST cipher by no means implies wholesale dismantling of the security of the SpeedPass network, nor easy theft of automobiles. The cryptographic challenge-response protocols of DST devices constitute only one of several layers of security in these systems. The SpeedPass network has on-line fraud detection mechanisms loosely analogous to those employed for traditional credit-card transaction processing. Thus an attacker that simulates a target DST cannot do so with complete impunity; suspicious usage patterns may result in flagging and disabling of a SpeedPass device in the network. The most serious system-wide threat lies in the ability of an attacker to target and simulate multiple DSTs, as suggested in our example scenarios below. In some sense, the threat to automobile immobilizers is more serious, as: (1) An automobile is effectively an off-line security system and (2) A single successful attack on an automobile immobilizer can result in full compromise of the vehicle. While compromise of a DST does not immediately permit theft of an automobile, it renders an automobile with an immobilizer as vulnerable to theft as an automobile without one. Such a rollback in automobile security has serious implications. As noted above, significant declines in automobile theft rates - up to 90% - have been attributed to immobilizers during their initial introduction. Even now, automobile theft is an enormous criminal industry, with 1,260,471 automobile thefts registered by the FBI in 2003 in the United States alone, for a total estimated loss of $8.6 billion.
Extracting the key from a DST device requires the harvesting of two challenge-response pairs. As a result, there are certain physical obstacles to successful attack. Nonetheless, bypassing the cryptographic protections in DST devices results in considerably elevated real-world threats.
There are effectively two different methods by which an attacker may harvest signals from a target DST, and two different corresponding physical ranges.
The equipment needed to capture the data required to clone a DST tag at close range. From left, a microreader, a laptop, and a serial cable.
The first mode of attack is active scanning: The attacker brings a reader in her control within scanning range of the target DST. DSTs of the type found in SpeedPass and automobile ignition keys are designed for short range scanning - on the order of a few centimeters. In practice, however, a longer range is achievable. In preliminary experiments, we have achieved an effective range of several inches for a DST on a keyring in the pocket of a simulated victim using a tiny antenna. A DST may respond to as many as eight queries per second. Thus, it is possible to perform the two scans requisite for our simulation attacks in as little as one-quarter of a second. At the limit of the range achievable by a given antenna, however, scanning becomes somewhat unreliable, and can require more time.
The second mode of attack is passive eavesdropping. Limitations on the effective range of active scanning stem from the requirement that a reader antenna furnish power to the target DST. An attacker might instead eavesdrop on the communication between a legitimate reader and a target DST during a valid authentication session. In this case, the attacker need not furnish power to the DST; the effective eavesdropping range then depends solely on the ability to intercept the signal emitted by the DST. We have not performed any experiments to determine the range at which this attack might be mounted. It is worth noting purported U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports, however, of successful eavesdropping of this kind on 13.56 Mhz tags at a distance of some tens of feet. The DST, however, operates at 134 kHz. Signals at this considerably lower frequency penetrate obstacles more effectively, which may facilitate eavesdropping; on the other hand, larger antennas are required for effective signal interception.
Only careful experimentation will permit accurate assessment of the degree of these two threats. Our cursory experiments, however, suggest that the threats are well within the realm of practical execution.
The most straightforward architectural fix to the problems we describe here is simple: The underlying cryptography should be based on a standard, publicly scrutinized algorithm with an adequate key length, e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in its 128-bit form, or more appropriately for this application, HMAC-SHA1. From a commercial standpoint, this approach may be problematic in two respects. First, the required circuitry would result in a substantially increased manufacturing cost, and might have other impacts on the overall system architecture due to increased power consumption. Second, there is the problem of backwards compatability. It would be expensive to replace all existing DST-based immobilizer keys. Indeed, given the long production cycles for automobiles, it might be difficult to introduce a new cipher into the immobilizers of a particular make of vehicle for a matter of years. TI has indicated to the authors that they have more secure RFID products available at present; in lieu of specifying these products, they refer to the site www.ti-rfid.com for information.
In fact, RFID chips with somewhat longer key-lengths are already available in the marketplace and used in a range of automobile immobilizers. Philips offers two cryptographically enabled RFID chips for immobilizers. The Philips HITAG 2, however, has a 48-bit secret key, and thus offers only marginally better resistance to a brute-force attack-- certainly not a comfortable level for long-term security. The Philips SECT, in contrast, has a 128-bit key. The HITAG 2 algorithm is proprietary, while Philips data sheets do not appear to offer information about the cryptographic algorithm underpinning their SECT device. It is difficult to say, therefore, whether these algorithms are well designed.
Faraday shielding offers a short-term, partial remedy. In particular, users may encase their DSTs in aluminum foil or some suitable radio-reflective shielding when not using them. This would defend against active scanning attacks, but not against passive eavesdropping. Moreover, this approach is rather inconvenient, and would probably prove an unworkable imposition on most users. A different measure worth investigation is the placement of metal shielding in the form of a partial cylinder around the ignition-key slot in automobiles. This could have the effect of attenuating the effective eavesdropping range.
In the long-term, the best approach is, of course, the development of solid, well-modeled cryptographic protocols predicated on industry-standard algorithms, with key lengths suitable for long-term hardware deployment.
I found these videos to help you out. With your little hacking adventure.
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/in...how=7#cooliris
( this information is for educational purposes only, to help you with security)
You could find out what kind of cryptography they are using for the locks that would make it 10x easier to pick the lock and your one step closer to stealing it. Organic vs Electronic security have both their flaws. A metal key or an electronic key, both can be breached using brute force. Normally the Diablo or typicllay any Lamborgini will have radio-frequency keylocks and igigniton starters. Using Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) from your labtop you could easily unlock the Diablo and start it. That is were my knowledge comes in handy.
I myself have cracked RFID, and TI DST. The encryption algorithm used in the TI DST tags is an unpublished, proprietary cipher that uses a 40-bit key. The algorithm was designed in the early 1990's by engineers at Texas Intruments, but is still being deploying in current systems. By today's standards, a 40-bit key is unacceptably short: advances in computing power have made such keys succeptable to brute-force key guessing attacks. Therefore, the actual security of the DST system rests with the secrecy of the proprietary algorithm used in the tags. One of the most important principles in cryptographic design states, however, that the security of a system should be based only on the secrecy of the keys, never on the secrecy of the algorithm.
We used some new special-purpose cryptanalytic techniques to reconstruct the algorithm used in the DST tags, by simply observing the responses that actual DST tags computed when presented with a large number of specially chosen challeneges. Using this black-box reverse-engineering method, we were able to implement a software program that, when given the same challenge and key as an actual tag, would compute the same response.
Our next step was to recover the secret key from a deployed DST device, using a brute-force key search. Unfortunately, it would have taken more than 2 weeks for our software implementation to find a key when running on 10 very fast PCs. We therefore implemented our key-search on a field programmable gate array (FPGA). The FPGA evaluation board we used is available online for under $200 in single quantities with all of the neccesary development software and cabling. Our implementation cracks 32 keys in parallel on a single FPGA running at 100MHz. At this rate, a single FPGA is expected to crack a key in just over 10 hours.
To decrease this key-cracking time even furthur, we connected 16 FPGAs together at a total cost of under $3,500. Texas Instruments provided us with 5 DST tags whose keys we did not know. The 16-way parallel cracker was able to recover all 5 keys in well under 2 hours.
We are currently developing and testing even faster and cheaper methods for recovering DST keys and will update this page with these results when they become available. The details are available in our academic paper.
After recovering a key, in order to attack a real DST system, we needed to create a radio device that could speak the same protocol as a hardware DST tag. This device would allow us to quickly extract the information needed to recover a key from a target DST device, and once the key was cracked, completely emulate the DST to a legitimate reader.
To accomplish this, we equipped a small and easily portable PC with a Measurement Computing digital-to-analog conversion (DAC) board; this board is also capable of analog-to-digital conversion. The DAC board can perform 12-bit A/D conversions on an input signal at a rate of 1.25 MHz and can perform D/A conversions and generate an output signal at a rate of 1 MHz.
We connected the input and output channels on our DAC board to an antenna tuned to the correct frequency range. We wrote modulation and demodulation software routines to decode and produce the analog AM signals transmitted by the TI reader as well as FM-FSK analog signals transmitted by the transponders. Using these routines, our equipment can eavesdrop on the communication protocol between a DST reader and transponder, or participate actively in a protocol by emulating either device. More details on this software radio solution are available in the academic paper.
To validate our attack, we extracted the key from our own SpeedPass token and simulated it in our independent programmable RF device. We purchased gasoline successfully at an ExxonMobil station multiple times in the course of a single day using this digital simulator. Similarly, we recovered the cryptographic key from a DST in the ignition key of our 2005 model Ford Escape SUV. By simulating the DST, we spoofed the immobilizer authentication system and started the vehicle with a bare ignition key, that is, with one that possessed no DST at all. Viewed another way, we created the pre-conditions for hot-wiring the vehicle.
Our attack on the DST cipher by no means implies wholesale dismantling of the security of the SpeedPass network, nor easy theft of automobiles. The cryptographic challenge-response protocols of DST devices constitute only one of several layers of security in these systems. The SpeedPass network has on-line fraud detection mechanisms loosely analogous to those employed for traditional credit-card transaction processing. Thus an attacker that simulates a target DST cannot do so with complete impunity; suspicious usage patterns may result in flagging and disabling of a SpeedPass device in the network. The most serious system-wide threat lies in the ability of an attacker to target and simulate multiple DSTs, as suggested in our example scenarios below. In some sense, the threat to automobile immobilizers is more serious, as: (1) An automobile is effectively an off-line security system and (2) A single successful attack on an automobile immobilizer can result in full compromise of the vehicle. While compromise of a DST does not immediately permit theft of an automobile, it renders an automobile with an immobilizer as vulnerable to theft as an automobile without one. Such a rollback in automobile security has serious implications. As noted above, significant declines in automobile theft rates - up to 90% - have been attributed to immobilizers during their initial introduction. Even now, automobile theft is an enormous criminal industry, with 1,260,471 automobile thefts registered by the FBI in 2003 in the United States alone, for a total estimated loss of $8.6 billion.
Extracting the key from a DST device requires the harvesting of two challenge-response pairs. As a result, there are certain physical obstacles to successful attack. Nonetheless, bypassing the cryptographic protections in DST devices results in considerably elevated real-world threats.
There are effectively two different methods by which an attacker may harvest signals from a target DST, and two different corresponding physical ranges.
The equipment needed to capture the data required to clone a DST tag at close range. From left, a microreader, a laptop, and a serial cable.
The first mode of attack is active scanning: The attacker brings a reader in her control within scanning range of the target DST. DSTs of the type found in SpeedPass and automobile ignition keys are designed for short range scanning - on the order of a few centimeters. In practice, however, a longer range is achievable. In preliminary experiments, we have achieved an effective range of several inches for a DST on a keyring in the pocket of a simulated victim using a tiny antenna. A DST may respond to as many as eight queries per second. Thus, it is possible to perform the two scans requisite for our simulation attacks in as little as one-quarter of a second. At the limit of the range achievable by a given antenna, however, scanning becomes somewhat unreliable, and can require more time.
The second mode of attack is passive eavesdropping. Limitations on the effective range of active scanning stem from the requirement that a reader antenna furnish power to the target DST. An attacker might instead eavesdrop on the communication between a legitimate reader and a target DST during a valid authentication session. In this case, the attacker need not furnish power to the DST; the effective eavesdropping range then depends solely on the ability to intercept the signal emitted by the DST. We have not performed any experiments to determine the range at which this attack might be mounted. It is worth noting purported U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports, however, of successful eavesdropping of this kind on 13.56 Mhz tags at a distance of some tens of feet. The DST, however, operates at 134 kHz. Signals at this considerably lower frequency penetrate obstacles more effectively, which may facilitate eavesdropping; on the other hand, larger antennas are required for effective signal interception.
Only careful experimentation will permit accurate assessment of the degree of these two threats. Our cursory experiments, however, suggest that the threats are well within the realm of practical execution.
The most straightforward architectural fix to the problems we describe here is simple: The underlying cryptography should be based on a standard, publicly scrutinized algorithm with an adequate key length, e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in its 128-bit form, or more appropriately for this application, HMAC-SHA1. From a commercial standpoint, this approach may be problematic in two respects. First, the required circuitry would result in a substantially increased manufacturing cost, and might have other impacts on the overall system architecture due to increased power consumption. Second, there is the problem of backwards compatability. It would be expensive to replace all existing DST-based immobilizer keys. Indeed, given the long production cycles for automobiles, it might be difficult to introduce a new cipher into the immobilizers of a particular make of vehicle for a matter of years. TI has indicated to the authors that they have more secure RFID products available at present; in lieu of specifying these products, they refer to the site www.ti-rfid.com for information.
In fact, RFID chips with somewhat longer key-lengths are already available in the marketplace and used in a range of automobile immobilizers. Philips offers two cryptographically enabled RFID chips for immobilizers. The Philips HITAG 2, however, has a 48-bit secret key, and thus offers only marginally better resistance to a brute-force attack-- certainly not a comfortable level for long-term security. The Philips SECT, in contrast, has a 128-bit key. The HITAG 2 algorithm is proprietary, while Philips data sheets do not appear to offer information about the cryptographic algorithm underpinning their SECT device. It is difficult to say, therefore, whether these algorithms are well designed.
Faraday shielding offers a short-term, partial remedy. In particular, users may encase their DSTs in aluminum foil or some suitable radio-reflective shielding when not using them. This would defend against active scanning attacks, but not against passive eavesdropping. Moreover, this approach is rather inconvenient, and would probably prove an unworkable imposition on most users. A different measure worth investigation is the placement of metal shielding in the form of a partial cylinder around the ignition-key slot in automobiles. This could have the effect of attenuating the effective eavesdropping range.
In the long-term, the best approach is, of course, the development of solid, well-modeled cryptographic protocols predicated on industry-standard algorithms, with key lengths suitable for long-term hardware deployment.
I found these videos to help you out. With your little hacking adventure.
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/in...how=7#cooliris
Thread Starter
|
1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
So why such big giant companies sell us these crumy systems without going to a cheaper solution...finguer print...voice recognition..etc...these technologies exist and are cheaper ...and it is theire responasability to protect us the clients..specialy were paying so much ...i sopke to Audi GMBH ..and they said the issue is complicated...and that they will contact me in few days...
cheers
cheers
Thread Starter
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1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
Welll hear this,
Eye Recognition, finguer print recongnition, voice recongnition all availiable in teh mnarket...its being used in airports...ATM'S .. every where...i do not understand why car manufacturors did not use these methods at least as options for clients to have instead of all the easy to hack junk .... BEST ANTI THEFT TOOLS IS PROTECTION
Eye Recognition, finguer print recongnition, voice recongnition all availiable in teh mnarket...its being used in airports...ATM'S .. every where...i do not understand why car manufacturors did not use these methods at least as options for clients to have instead of all the easy to hack junk .... BEST ANTI THEFT TOOLS IS PROTECTION
Thread Starter
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1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
Hi,
Guys look at this : Compared to conventional techniques such as ID cards, keys, and passwords, the Panasonic Iris Reader system can be much less costly to administer and operate, and can easily accommodate larger numbers of personnel as your needs grow. And unlike ID cards and passwords, Iris Reader is almost impossible to 'spoof' or to counterfeit.
Compared to other types of biometric systems, Panasonic Iris Reader can be more accurate and precise. With a false acceptance ratio of 0.001% to 0.0001%, Iris Reader is:
* 100 to 1,000 times more accurate than spot fingerprinting
* 1,000 to 10,000 times more accurate than hand-print verification
* 3,000% more accurate than voice-prints
And Panasonic sells this at 360$...its just a small hardeware can be concealed in the mirror, and the application added to the MMI system, to have it priduced and fitted on cars, it would replace immobilizzers or by all ,eans add on them, and as it ould be connected diretly to the car pc there would be no risk of hacking for use of blue tooth or infra red or any other frequency or wave...trully shame on car manufacturars..such a simple thing eleiminates car theft...but ofcource would reduce car sales..there is a conflict of intrest as sellers looking to service at theire best and sellers looking to witholde systems that can realy protect in order to keep sales higher .
Guys we all deserve to have the choice to keep what we pay for, even if i place an order with panasonic for a gadget like that , i would need AUDI to have the MMI accept the application, they even dont give us that option even if we would like to order it .
When a manufacturar decline to look at existing technologie while it can save the intrest of it clients, it means it failed to do it intentionaly for commercial reasons , or unantentionaly with is worst , it means that theire not looking into the best options to service the clients...
cheers
Guys look at this : Compared to conventional techniques such as ID cards, keys, and passwords, the Panasonic Iris Reader system can be much less costly to administer and operate, and can easily accommodate larger numbers of personnel as your needs grow. And unlike ID cards and passwords, Iris Reader is almost impossible to 'spoof' or to counterfeit.
Compared to other types of biometric systems, Panasonic Iris Reader can be more accurate and precise. With a false acceptance ratio of 0.001% to 0.0001%, Iris Reader is:
* 100 to 1,000 times more accurate than spot fingerprinting
* 1,000 to 10,000 times more accurate than hand-print verification
* 3,000% more accurate than voice-prints
And Panasonic sells this at 360$...its just a small hardeware can be concealed in the mirror, and the application added to the MMI system, to have it priduced and fitted on cars, it would replace immobilizzers or by all ,eans add on them, and as it ould be connected diretly to the car pc there would be no risk of hacking for use of blue tooth or infra red or any other frequency or wave...trully shame on car manufacturars..such a simple thing eleiminates car theft...but ofcource would reduce car sales..there is a conflict of intrest as sellers looking to service at theire best and sellers looking to witholde systems that can realy protect in order to keep sales higher .
Guys we all deserve to have the choice to keep what we pay for, even if i place an order with panasonic for a gadget like that , i would need AUDI to have the MMI accept the application, they even dont give us that option even if we would like to order it .
When a manufacturar decline to look at existing technologie while it can save the intrest of it clients, it means it failed to do it intentionaly for commercial reasons , or unantentionaly with is worst , it means that theire not looking into the best options to service the clients...
cheers
Thread Starter
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1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
Hello evybodey, new info
Audi AND VW Knew that the cars they had were easy to steel
since may 2006..even the soccer player david bekham had his Q7 stolen while he was having lunch i quote the following:
http://episteme.arstechnica.com/eve/...om&x_ddp=Y
kragbax [/align] Ars Tribunus Militum
et Subscriptor
Tribus: The bitterness is strong in this one.[/align] Registered: March 13, 2000[/align] Posts: 2109[/align]
Posted document.write('+ myTimeZone('Thu, 04 May 2006 09:55:17 GMT-0700', 'May 04, 2006 12:55')+');May 04, 2006 13:55 May 04, 2006 12:55 [/align] This is probably why VW won't give out the ECU keys anymore even if you have all the documentation in the world proving you own the car. I got mine but not before calling every dealer in the state and found one who didn't have the new connection software to Germany yet. Even then I needed the VIN & ECU serial number, the SN is only available if you have a laptop and the required software.
I reckon you could start any VW/Audi pretty easily if you got the code, a laptop, a key fob and some manner of circumventing the locks. Use the laptop to get the info, call the dealer (insider maybe?), add the key transmitter to the security system, turn the ignition and away you go. It would be harder now that the keys aren't available to even the dealers.
I'm assuming the laptop sends a stream of codes until it triggers the lock, which would be a stupid thing for car manufacturers to overlook and easy to implement on new cars. Why not have cars disregard all codes for x minutes if more than a set number are received? Unless there are only handful of possibilities this could prevent brute forcing. Just throwing that out as a possibility, I'm not even sure if that is how the attack works.
End quote
Now if a company new about a flow in teh security system, and did not do anything about it or even gave no warning, i call that intentinal facilitation for theives, false advertisment, etc... the list never ends...all i knwo Audi and VW groupe knew about this mess since may at least and i got My new Audi Q7 stolen, and its not fair at all...nobodey should suffer a thing like that while it could have been prevented...
cheers
[/align]
Audi AND VW Knew that the cars they had were easy to steel
since may 2006..even the soccer player david bekham had his Q7 stolen while he was having lunch i quote the following:
http://episteme.arstechnica.com/eve/...om&x_ddp=Y
kragbax [/align] Ars Tribunus Militum
et Subscriptor
Tribus: The bitterness is strong in this one.[/align] Registered: March 13, 2000[/align] Posts: 2109[/align]
Posted document.write('+ myTimeZone('Thu, 04 May 2006 09:55:17 GMT-0700', 'May 04, 2006 12:55')+');May 04, 2006 13:55 May 04, 2006 12:55 [/align] This is probably why VW won't give out the ECU keys anymore even if you have all the documentation in the world proving you own the car. I got mine but not before calling every dealer in the state and found one who didn't have the new connection software to Germany yet. Even then I needed the VIN & ECU serial number, the SN is only available if you have a laptop and the required software.I reckon you could start any VW/Audi pretty easily if you got the code, a laptop, a key fob and some manner of circumventing the locks. Use the laptop to get the info, call the dealer (insider maybe?), add the key transmitter to the security system, turn the ignition and away you go. It would be harder now that the keys aren't available to even the dealers.
I'm assuming the laptop sends a stream of codes until it triggers the lock, which would be a stupid thing for car manufacturers to overlook and easy to implement on new cars. Why not have cars disregard all codes for x minutes if more than a set number are received? Unless there are only handful of possibilities this could prevent brute forcing. Just throwing that out as a possibility, I'm not even sure if that is how the attack works.
End quote
Now if a company new about a flow in teh security system, and did not do anything about it or even gave no warning, i call that intentinal facilitation for theives, false advertisment, etc... the list never ends...all i knwo Audi and VW groupe knew about this mess since may at least and i got My new Audi Q7 stolen, and its not fair at all...nobodey should suffer a thing like that while it could have been prevented...
cheers
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Thread Starter
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1st Gear
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 17
RE: Q7 STOLEN
Hi , am trying to find out now wich company developped the alarm system and the immobilizer for the Q7? and what kind of tests did Audi put it through...according to local police now the total of Q7 stolen in one month in the city of kiev is 9
2nd Gear
Joined: Feb 2006
Posts: 931
From: New York
RE: Q7 STOLEN
ORIGINAL: fady
Hi,
Guys look at this : Compared to conventional techniques such as ID cards, keys, and passwords, the Panasonic Iris Reader system can be much less costly to administer and operate, and can easily accommodate larger numbers of personnel as your needs grow. And unlike ID cards and passwords, Iris Reader is almost impossible to 'spoof' or to counterfeit.
Compared to other types of biometric systems, Panasonic Iris Reader can be more accurate and precise. With a false acceptance ratio of 0.001% to 0.0001%, Iris Reader is:
* 100 to 1,000 times more accurate than spot fingerprinting
* 1,000 to 10,000 times more accurate than hand-print verification
* 3,000% more accurate than voice-prints
And Panasonic sells this at 360$...its just a small hardeware can be concealed in the mirror, and the application added to the MMI system, to have it priduced and fitted on cars, it would replace immobilizzers or by all ,eans add on them, and as it ould be connected diretly to the car pc there would be no risk of hacking for use of blue tooth or infra red or any other frequency or wave...trully shame on car manufacturars..such a simple thing eleiminates car theft...but ofcource would reduce car sales..there is a conflict of intrest as sellers looking to service at theire best and sellers looking to witholde systems that can realy protect in order to keep sales higher .
Guys we all deserve to have the choice to keep what we pay for, even if i place an order with panasonic for a gadget like that , i would need AUDI to have the MMI accept the application, they even dont give us that option even if we would like to order it .
When a manufacturar decline to look at existing technologie while it can save the intrest of it clients, it means it failed to do it intentionaly for commercial reasons , or unantentionaly with is worst , it means that theire not looking into the best options to service the clients...
cheers
Hi,
Guys look at this : Compared to conventional techniques such as ID cards, keys, and passwords, the Panasonic Iris Reader system can be much less costly to administer and operate, and can easily accommodate larger numbers of personnel as your needs grow. And unlike ID cards and passwords, Iris Reader is almost impossible to 'spoof' or to counterfeit.
Compared to other types of biometric systems, Panasonic Iris Reader can be more accurate and precise. With a false acceptance ratio of 0.001% to 0.0001%, Iris Reader is:
* 100 to 1,000 times more accurate than spot fingerprinting
* 1,000 to 10,000 times more accurate than hand-print verification
* 3,000% more accurate than voice-prints
And Panasonic sells this at 360$...its just a small hardeware can be concealed in the mirror, and the application added to the MMI system, to have it priduced and fitted on cars, it would replace immobilizzers or by all ,eans add on them, and as it ould be connected diretly to the car pc there would be no risk of hacking for use of blue tooth or infra red or any other frequency or wave...trully shame on car manufacturars..such a simple thing eleiminates car theft...but ofcource would reduce car sales..there is a conflict of intrest as sellers looking to service at theire best and sellers looking to witholde systems that can realy protect in order to keep sales higher .
Guys we all deserve to have the choice to keep what we pay for, even if i place an order with panasonic for a gadget like that , i would need AUDI to have the MMI accept the application, they even dont give us that option even if we would like to order it .
When a manufacturar decline to look at existing technologie while it can save the intrest of it clients, it means it failed to do it intentionaly for commercial reasons , or unantentionaly with is worst , it means that theire not looking into the best options to service the clients...
cheers
). Good luck speeding, because if you arrive at point b driving over the speed limit from point ayou get a ticket automatically.Andnext comes theability for the government todisableyour vehicle from starting if you don't pay your parking tickets,and on and on... Welcome to the future...I don't think all these security measures are going to do much anywayif the police are involved (probably paid off). Looks like you're either going to have to pay upyourself or never see your car again.
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